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Had Gladstone presented home rule as an essential reform in the administration of 
Ireland rather than as an attempt to redress historic wrongs, then it would have been 
better argued and could well have achieved greater success. That Dublin Castle 
provided an ineffective administration was not disputed by any opinion, in fact it had 
become axiomatic that the Irish administrative system was hopelessly chaotic. Any 
who came in contact with the Castle were stunned by the disarray.1 But it was the 
inexorable rise in the cost of the Irish administration that most worried Gladstone and 
offended his own convictions on the proper relationship between the state and the 
electorate. One of the great political achievements of Gladstone had been in his 1868–
1874 government, when he had established the minimal state as a central value in 
British public life.2 The civil service of this minimal state was informed by a deep 
sense of duty to minimise the expenditure of public moneys. This was achieved 
through competitive entry by examination to the civil service, strict Treasury control 
of state spending allied with full public accountability for money spent. Under 
Gladstone the core function of the civil service of raising and spending taxes achieved 
                                                
1Dudley W.R. Bahlman (ed.) The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton (3 vols; 
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a moral as well as a fiscal dimension.3 But this was not the case in Dublin Castle 
where it seemed the role of civil servants was to encourage the Irish demand for 
expenditure. Presenting home rule as a necessary moral lesson to teach the Irish frugal 
self-government would have been more popular in the House of Commons than 
righting historic wrongs and more consistent with Gladstone’s essential conservatism 
on the role of the state. Penny-pinching and tight-fistedness were more convincing 
than displays of Gladstonian righteousness. Scattered throughout his great 
introductory speech of 8 April 1886 there is an argument that, had it been presented as 
a coherent whole, may well have succeeded in getting the legislation through the 
House of Commons.4 Gladstone argued that as Irish electorate did not have to bear the 
cost of the expansion in the state’s responsibilities in Ireland, their political 
representatives could freely demand ever new innovations in state activism. Indeed 
these politicians courted popularity by encouraging the view that the Irish had a right 
to pillage the British Treasury. The Castle administration, that ought to be animated 
by a consciousness of the permanent necessity of retrenchment in government, either 
acquiesced or positively assisted in the attack on the British Treasury. The Irish 
administration, instead of acting as a restraint on state expenditure, had evolved into a 
mechanism for aiding and abetting Irish politicians in extracting more and more from 
the British taxpayer. Few in the Conservative or Liberal ranks would have disagreed 
with his view that the ability of the poorer country of the United Kingdom to draw 
without restraint from the pocket of her wealthier partner was actually assisted rather 
than hindered by the Irish administrative system. Therefore, as Gladstone argued 
                                                
3H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone 1809–1898 (Oxford, 1997), p. 640; John Maloney, 
‘Gladstone as Chancellor’, Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 20 (Autumn, 1998), 
pp. 12–16. 
4Parliamentary debates [PD], Third Series, CCCIV, 8 Apr. 1886, cc. 1050–51; 1072–
78; 1080–84. 
 
 
  
privately but failed to drive home in the debate, the efficient (that is, cheaper) 
government of Ireland was as much a British as an Irish problem.5 H.C.E. Childers, 
expressing the Treasury view, was prepared to support home rule for Ireland as a 
‘welcome relief for the British taxpayer’.6 Hartington was prepared to admit the 
necessity for the reform of the Castle and the need for devolved administrative 
authority.7 The urgent need to fundamentally recast the Irish administration was 
admitted on all sides and so had no politically divisive implications. None could have 
opposed a proposal to compel the Irish themselves to pay the cost of the interventions 
that they now constantly demanded.8 
        
Comparing the 1886 and 1893 home rule bills it is even more apparent that 
Gladstone’s unchanging core objective was not to devolve legislative authority, but 
rather to reduce the ability of an Irish executive to draw on the British Treasury. The 
legislative body went through radical changes. Kendle lists seven significant ways in 
which the later proposal differed from the earlier. In both the 1886 and 1893 
proposals the lord lieutenant, as representing the executive power of the crown, was 
retained but in the 1893 proposal he was to be assisted and advised by an executive 
committee drawn from the privy council of Ireland and his term of office was to be 
fixed at six years. The 1886 bill proposed a complex mix of a single chamber with 
two orders. The model that was being drawn upon was not Westminster but the 
Church of Ireland Synod created after disestablishment. The orders could meet and 
                                                
5Agatha Ramm (ed.) The political correspondence of Mr Gladstone and lord 
Granville 1876–1886, II, 1883–1886 (Oxford, 1962), p. 10.  
6Ibid., p. 396, Granville to Gladstone 11 Sept. 1885. 
7A.B. Cooke and John Vincent, The Governing Passion Cabinet Government and 
Party Politics in Britain 1885–86 (Brighton, 1974), p. 111. 
8Theodore K. Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, (Oxford, 1998), pp. 673–74; 
Alvin Jackson, Home Rule and Irish History (London, 2003), pp. 63–64; D. George 
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vote separately or together, as they wished. In the1893 bill this had been replaced by 
two distinct chambers meeting separately. Irish representation at Westminster showed 
Gladstone to be even more undecided. In 1886 Ireland was to be excluded; the ‘out’ 
option. In 1893 Irish representation at Westminster was to be retained but on ‘in and 
out’ basis. This was abandoned in committee and Ireland was ‘in’ by vote of the 
Commons.9 
   
In contrast to woolliness on legislative and representative structures, Gladstone 
showed a consistent determination to limit the ability of an expansionary Irish state to 
draw from the British Treasury.10 It is clear that despite the rhetoric of ‘God’s 
Judgement on England’ and ‘Justice for Ireland’, Gladstone’s primary objective was 
financial rather than legislative autonomy for Ireland. In fact Ireland was to be made 
to pay for the services of the British civil service under Home Rule. The financial 
clauses of the 1886 bill imposed a prior annual charge on the Irish budget of £110,000 
for the ‘imperial civil service’ in Ireland. These were the non-transferred departments 
such as customs or the ordnance survey, thus charging the Irish taxpayer for the 
privilege of imperial rule. The pursuit of more economical government under home 
rule was therefore expected to bear down especially hard on the Irish civil service. 
     
Gladstone had experienced Irish civil servants’ ability to combine with Irish 
politicians against the Treasury when they inflicted a defeat on his 1868–74 
government. In 1866 in Dublin a Civil Service Committee memorialised the Treasury 
with a request for equality with London salaries, a request that was promptly rejected.  
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10Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 82–83. 
 
 
  
The problem with the memorial was not the claim that it made for equality with 
London but rather the threat to mount a political campaign amongst the Irish M.P.s to 
put parliamentary pressure on the Treasury should it refuse to accede to their request. 
This, as the Treasury fumed, was expressly forbidden by official procedures and was 
‘subversive of all discipline and of the proper subordination which ought to exist in 
the various grades of the civil service.’11 However the Irish civil servants were not at 
all afraid of breaching discipline and, using David Plunket, Conservative M.P. for 
Dublin University, launched their campaign. Plunket was close to the civil servants 
and often reflected their views and concerns.12 In July 1870 he rose in the House of 
Commons to ask Gladstone whether he was aware of the statement prepared by a 
committee of the permanent civil servants in Ireland which showed that a great 
disparity existed between the scales of salary of corresponding government offices in 
London and in Dublin and whether he was prepared to redress this inequality. 
Gladstone’s reply, whilst denying the validity of the comparison between London and 
Dublin and upholding the Treasury view that valid comparisons could be only with 
comparable local employers, conceded that were it to be shown that civil servants of 
the same class were on a poorer pay scale in Dublin than London that would require a 
fuller examination.13 The civil servants then submitted an analysis of the work and 
salaries of the General Register Offices in Dublin and London, detailing the inferior 
scales in the former. Shrugging off the Treasury rebuttal of their analysis the staff 
                                                
11National Archives, London  (NA), T14/38,to the Register General Ireland, 7 June 
1866. 
12See the opening remarks in National Library Ireland [NLI], p. 1289, Charles Henry 
Brien, ‘An Address on some of the influences of scientific enquiry on modern thought 
delivered before the Civil Service Literary Society 24 Nov. 1873’.  
13P D, CCII, c. 1620, 7 July 1870. 
 
 
  
continued to mount a political lobby of their case.14 Aggressive political pressure 
succeeded where submissive memorials failed and the Irish civil servants eventually 
got their inquiry. 
   
Charged with investigating specific Dublin departments the inquiry had also to look 
into the ‘causes of dissatisfaction which exist amongst the members of the civil 
service serving in Ireland’.15 With the formation of the commission Irish civil servants 
bombarded their departmental heads with memorials asking for improvements in pay, 
knowing that these would be just as quickly passed on to the Treasury without 
examination, with a suggestion that they be referred on to the commission. The 
Treasury had to remind the Castle that ‘nothing has occurred to relieve the Irish 
government or the chiefs of particular departments from the ordinary responsibility of 
minutely criticising every application for increased salary which is made to them and 
of submitting to the Treasury those applications only which they themselves believe 
to be just and necessary’.16 The commission immediately opened up the rich vein of 
ambiguity around the civil service in Ireland, as it was not at all clear what exactly the 
term ‘Irish’ civil service meant. The Geological Service in Ireland (GSI) was a very 
big department. In response to pressure from the GSI staff for inclusion in the inquiry, 
the Treasury replied that this department was part of the ‘Imperial’ service and 
therefore could not be included in an ‘Irish’ inquiry. Attempting to clarify further this 
newly-created distinction between the Irish and the Imperial service the Treasury 
                                                
14Report of the commissioners appointed…to enquire into the condition of the civil 
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15Ibid., p. 1; P D, CCXVI, cc. 1805–31, 4 July 1873. 
16NA, T14/43/473, Treasury to the Under-Secretary Ireland, 3 Jan. 1873. 
 
 
  
decided that the Irish service were those departments having their centre in Dublin 
and having a classification of salaries exclusively Irish, all others were ‘imperial’.17 
   
The evidence of the civil servants to the commission shows a Pooteresque obsession 
with status and respectability, values which permeated the civil service and were in all 
probability shared by the commissioners. Civil servants, they complained, were so 
poorly paid they could not maintain an upright and independent position in society. It 
was even the case that due to their low salaries some civil servants were compelled to 
live side by side with artisans rather than amongst the respectable middle classes. Not 
surprisingly the inquiry found that the causes of dissatisfaction amongst the Irish civil 
servants were the general inadequacy of their salary scales along with the inferior 
rates of pay offered to analogous offices in Dublin as compared with London. 
However the commissioners decided that to determine whether that disparity was 
justified would require a classification of all the offices in the entire United Kingdom 
civil service, a task beyond the ability of the inquiry.18 
 
The government sat on the report while the Treasury officials dissected it.19 In 
parliament David Plunket once again took up the case of the Irish civil servants. His 
resolution in the House of Commons asked that the commission having reported that 
the Irish civil service salaries were indeed inadequate, the Irish civil servants should 
now be placed upon ‘an equality as to remuneration with those performing duties in 
England corresponding in difficulty and responsibility’.20 Plunket, and presumably the 
                                                
17NA, T14/44/508, Treasury to Pim esq. MP 1 Jan. 1874; T14/45/222, 9 May 1874. 
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19PD, CCXIV, c. 154 (7 Feb. 1873); CCXV (24 Mar. 1873); CCXV, cc. 345–46 (31 
Mar. 1873). 
20Ibid., CCVI, cc. 1805–31 (4 July 1873). 
 
 
  
civil servants who briefed him, were only too willing to admit that a classification of 
the entire civil service to meet the special case of the Irish civil service was 
impractical. He assured the House of Commons that the Irish civil servants would be 
perfectly content with the simple removal of inequalities between London and 
Dublin.21 The debate shows that support for the Irish civil servants case crossed 
Liberal and Conservative party boundaries amongst the Irish M.P.s. Plunket was 
himself a Conservative.  He was supported by his fellow conservatives Jonathan (?) 
Pim, the Conservative M.P. for Cork City and Henry Bruen, Conservative for County 
Carlow. Liberal supporters were Dominic Corrigan the M.P. for Dublin City and 
McCarthy Downing, M.P. for Cork County. The supporters of Plunket’s motion, in 
quasi-nationalist speeches, attacked what they saw as the degraded status implied by 
the inferior salaries of the Irish civil servants. The most striking thing about the 
government response in the debate is the absence of any contribution from either the 
Lord Lieutenant or the Chief Secretary Ireland. Instead the government side was 
monopolised by the Chancellor Robert Lowe and by Gladstone, thus signalling that 
the government viewed this as an economic rather than Irish debate. The Treasury 
analysis of the report informed both Lowe and Gladstone’s response.22 Lowe first 
dismissed the view that prices should determine salaries. Only the immutable law of 
supply and demand could regulate salaries. Second, he offered as a concession that 
the Treasury might be directed to examine in accord with its usual procedures the 
staffing and salary levels of the various Irish offices whilst admitting that the salaries 
in the RGO were self-evidently too low and required immediate redress. Gladstone 
strongly supported Lowe although he was in fact to force his resignation as 
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Chancellor within the month and absorb the office into his own. Gladstone in a very 
defensive speech said that the government advocated the national interest whilst the 
Irish M.P.s had been representing the cause of a class, but that Irish pressure would 
not deflect his government away from the correct and economical practice toward a 
wholesale revision of Irish civil service salaries. 
   
The government suffered a humiliating defeat in the vote on Plunket’s motion. The 
defeat was due less to sympathy for the Irish civil servants amongst the Conservatives 
than loss of control of the House of Commons by the Liberals.23 This was a tired 
government running out of energy and ideas. It was weakened by its own badly 
managed resignation and resumption of office earlier in March. Its reputation for 
sound fiscal policy was struck a blow by irregularities in the Post Office Savings 
Bank and the scandals that surrounded the award of a contract for the telegraph to 
South Africa.24 In the aftermath of the defeat the government made it clear that 
regardless of any House of Commons motion they intended to adhere to the 
orthodoxy of market forces and periodic Treasury scrutiny of all departments.25 
Before leaving the 1873 debate it ought to be noted that the Irish civil servants were, 
in comparison to other Irish salary levels, quite well-paid. What rankled with the Irish 
civil servants was the gross inequality with London levels in a service that was 
supposedly becoming uniform. If merit was the criterion for entry and promotion in 
the civil service then unequal salaries for the same post in London and in Dublin 
implied a deficit of merit in Dublin civil servants. 
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As he prepared the 1886 home rule proposal one of the immediate benefits Gladstone 
anticipated therefore was that it would free the British state of a large part of the cost 
of the Irish civil service. In apologising to his Chancellor Lord Herschell for the ‘very 
good pecuniary terms’ offered to civil servants by his home rule bill Gladstone point 
out that the British exchequer ‘shall be well paid in being relieved from the constantly 
growing charge of the Irish civil service and in the reversion of a large part of that 
very claim upon our money’.26 As the bill was being discussed at Cabinet amongst the 
‘cardinal points’ agreed was that civil government would continue as it was until 
altered by arrangement, with some protection for the Dublin civil servants when those 
inevitable alterations did occur.27 Gladstone indicated that to ‘meet the case of the 
civil service’ he envisaged a provision to fix the compensation that might be given to 
persons dismissed by the new Irish government, suggesting that he expected a 
significant number of such dismissals.28 Earl Spencer, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 
suggested that the legislation ought to contain ‘a better refuge for civil servants who 
may be driven out by the new Government of Ireland’.29 James Bryce, the Liberal 
politician and former Professor of Law at Oxford, suggested a clause to maintain the 
civil service unchanged for three years, with provision thereafter to retire on 
pension.30 In introducing the bill Gladstone’s initial suggestion was that the civil 
service would be retained for two years only, to ensure stability. After the two years 
                                                
26Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, XI, p. 524, Gladstone to Lord Herschell, 4 Apr, 1886. 
27Cooke and Vincent, Governing Passion, p. 395. 
28Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, XI, p. 525, Gladstone to Lord Herschell, 5 Apr. 1886. 
29Peter Gordon (ed.) The Red Earl the Papers of the Fifth Earl Spencer 1835–1910, 
(1986), II, p. 112, Lord Spencer to Lord Herschell, 5 Apr. 1886. 
30Bryce Papers, National Library of Ireland [NLI], Ms 11009, ‘observations on legal 
points connected with the home rule bill’. 
 
 
  
both parties, the civil service and the Irish government, would be ‘free to negotiate 
afresh’.31 
 
In the initial draft of the home rule bill under the heading ‘civil powers’ Gladstone 
envisaged that the Irish Parliament should have complete autonomy to pass ‘any bill 
touching civil offices in Ireland and the mode of appointment thereto’. Under the 
heading ‘executive powers’ he provided that all the civil appointments already made 
would continue unchanged until altered by statute, except that the costs would now be 
charged upon the consolidated fund for Ireland.32 Thus there was generally expected, 
and accepted, that a home rule government would have complete control of its civil 
service and that this would lead to a significant reduction in numbers. 
  
In the 1886 Bill sections 28, 29 and 30 dealt with the civil servants.33 Section 28 
expressly stated that the Irish civil service would continue to hold the same offices, 
with the same or analogous duties, at the same salaries, allowances and pensions as 
before but the cost to be charged to Irish custom and excise receipts or to the 
consolidated funds. Section 29 provided for voluntary retirement, but after only two 
years of service under the home rule government, a year less than suggested by Bryce, 
perhaps to ensure finality and to meet the possibility of the return of a Conservative 
government in the next general election. Pensions in the cases of retiring or dismissed 
civil servants were to be calculated by the Treasury according to the never completed 
fourth schedule. Section 30 provided that existing pensions would, so far as possible, 
be drawn out of Irish revenues. It is clear that the main concern in drafting the bill was 
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to ensure that the Irish Parliament would bear the future cost of the Irish civil service 
along with any pensions consequent on dismissals, thus ensuring a prudent and 
cautious approach to both dismissals and recruitment. In doing that Gladstone may 
well have been responding in part to the fears of the Irish Unionists. In February their 
parliamentary leader Major Saunderson had outlined their objections to home rule. 
Acknowledging that the question of whether home rule would be good or bad for 
Ireland was, in itself, a matter of opinion, he forcefully outlined his objections to the 
home rulers themselves and his fear that once in control of the administration they 
would make a total sweep of all appointments and re-introduce the worst evils of 
corrupt patronage appointments.34 
   
The 1886 home rule bill did not reflect any analysis of the function of an Irish 
administration. It contained no provision for any ministerial or departmental 
structures but simply proposed to distribute the government of Ireland between 
Dublin and imperial administrations. Clearly it was expected that the vast bulk of the 
civil service in Ireland would be transferred to the home rule administration. When 
asked for a list of the civil appointments which would be ‘put at the disposal of the 
Irish government’ John Morley, the Chief Secretary, indicated that the intention was 
that ‘the whole of the Irish civil service would be transferred, with the exception of 
those who may be in the service of the imperial government’, though he assured 
‘provision was made for those whose service may be dispensed with’.35  Four days 
later when pressed to list the government departments that would be transferred to the 
Dublin government, Morley remained quite vague, indicating that the answer 
depended on the view that would be taken by an Irish executive of its requirements. In 
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terms of personal and grades those transferred would include heads of departments, 
superior appointments, clerical staff, servants and messengers. Morley also referred 
briefly to a problem that was to become more intractable; what exactly was a ‘civil 
servant’? Morley offered three qualifications of a civil servant; an official whose 
whole salary is voted by Parliament, whose whole time is at the disposal of the public 
and whose appointment carries a pension or gratuity.36 As was to become apparent, 
that neat definition did not even approach the reality of the Irish civil service. 
           
Civil servants, it was axiomatic, would always support a government policy, even if 
they disagreed with it. The Dublin civil servants seemed to have been ill-prepared for 
the 1886 home rule bill. Some, no doubt, could anticipate improved promotional 
prospects. There was some home rule sympathy at the top of the Castle bureaucracy; 
E.G.Jenkinson the head of the Criminal Investigation Division, and Sir Robert 
Hamilton the Under-Secretary, were considered very pronounced home rulers during 
the caretaker ministry of 1885.37 On his appointment as Under-Secretary Hamilton 
had been considered one of the best civil servants in Whitehall.38 However for the 
lower ranks the emphasis which the Liberal government put upon economy, and the 
virtual certainty as it seemed of wholesale dismissals by an Irish government wholly 
dependent on its own financial resources, can only have been threatening. In concrete 
terms what the bill offered the Irish civil service was nothing more than security for 
pensions already earned. The best that the civil servants could hope for was an 
improvement in the terms on which they might be dismissed. During the protracted 
1886 home rule debate it became apparent that the Irish civil service as a whole had 
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38Ibid., p. 350. 
 
 
  
few political friends and the treatment of the civil service failed to make an impact on 
the debate. There was a general cross-party agreement that, whatever about the 
political merits of home rule, the Irish administration was in need of a thorough 
shake-up. The duty of the British state extended no further than making sure that that 
shake-up was not any more painful for the civil servants concerned than was 
necessary. The bill itself and the debate in the Parliament brought home to the Irish 
civil servants their dispensability and separate status within the United Kingdom and 
encouraged a consciousness of that status. Previous organisation and agitation by 
them as a body had been fitful, focussed on pay, and conducted under the hostile eye 
of the Treasury. Home rule touched on fundamental issues of security and status and 
yet the Irish civil service proved slow to react. Luckily the 1886 bill failed, but the 
continuance of the future possibility of home rule necessitated, and made acceptable, 
the emergence of a more organised Irish civil service representation. The fact was that 
despite being a tradition-laden service, civil servants had no rights as such. All civil 
servants were employed ‘at the pleasure of the crown’ and therefore liable to be 
dismissed at any time without notice or redress. Civil servants were pensionable but 
nevertheless had no absolute right to a pension. Pensions remained as granted by 
grace and favour. The security enjoyed by civil servants was based on the good faith 
and practice of the government, which any cynic within the Irish civil service might 
justly set at nought. The fate of Sir Robert Hamilton was a further lesson on the 
fundamentally insecure status of the Irish civil service as well as a warning that it 
would be a foolish civil servant that became too closely identified with government 
policy. When Hamilton, a Scot in the Admiralty, took the post of Under-Secretary 
after the murder of Burke he had been acclaimed for his courage and sense of duty. In 
the home rule debate nationalists often cited him as a supporter and advisor to 
 
 
  
Gladstone on home rule. With the defeat of the home rule bill The Times began a 
campaign to have him removed from the Irish Under-Secretaryship, though this was 
now a post considered part of the permanent civil service. Despite the opposition of 
Lord Lingen of the Treasury and of some few supporters from within the Irish civil 
service, who were alarmed that a civil servant would be punished for too 
enthusiastically supporting government policy, Hamilton was kicked upstairs to 
become governor of Tasmania. This was about as far away from Ireland as he could 
be posted. In fairness it ought to be noted however that most Irish civil servants who 
feared being driven out by a National League government precisely because they 
would not be seen as supporters, would have had little sympathy for Hamilton who at 
least secured a better post and was assured a generous pension.39 
   
With the return of the Liberals to government in 1892 a second home rule proposal 
was expected. The Chief Secretary, John Morley, was under pressure from the Irish 
M.P.s T.M. Healy and William O’Brien who had both been advocating a different 
strategy for the Irish administration since the failure of the 1886 home rule proposal. 
Instead of waiting for a successful home rule act to transform the Irish government 
they had been separately urging executive use of the power of patronage to eradicate 
Unionist power in Dublin Castle through the recruitment and promotion of Catholic 
nationalists as civil servants.40 Morley immediately began to infuse the Castle with 
Catholic civil servants, but more as way to dilute the resistance that he anticipated any 
home rule proposal would raise. He was made well aware of the profound hostility to 
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home rule amongst the Castle officials.41 Gladstone was much taken with the idea of 
‘Drummondizing the administration of Ireland’ in preparation for another home rule 
attempt. Thomas Drummond had served as Irish Under-Secretary under the Earl of 
Musgrave in 1835 and was therefore effectively the head of the Irish civil service. A 
Benthamite technocrat he had cleaned the Castle of Orange Order influences whilst 
promoting some able Catholics. But he was principally concerned with bureaucratic 
efficiency, which meant centralising and consolidating power within the Irish 
administration.42 In Gladstone’s mouth ‘Drummondizing’ was an ambiguous phrase 
which could mean either Morley’s policy of promoting Catholics or a policy of 
promoting ruthlessly efficient technocrats.43 
          
In framing the second home rule bill Gladstone was even more vehement on the 
necessity to reduce the cost of the Irish civil service. In July 1892 in correspondence 
with Lord Spencer he referred to the need to fundamentally recast the administration 
in Dublin Castle.44 In Cabinet Gladstone stated as one of the principles of the home 
rule bill that it must achieve savings in the cost of the Irish civil service.45 Introducing 
the second reading of the bill he returned once again to the theme of the cost of the 
Irish civil service, describing it as ‘incredibly, almost immeasurable wasteful’ and 
asserting that ‘the civil government of Ireland costs twice as much per head as that of 
the greater country’.46 George Trevelyan, Scottish Secretary and son of the reforming 
                                                
41John Morley Papers, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library. Ms Eng.d. 3449, 
notebook diary, July 1891, f. 33; on civil service hostility to home rule see Ms Eng. d. 
3450, f. 107, 28 July 1892. 
42Alvin Jackson, Ireland 1798–1998 (Oxford, 1999), p. 45. 
43John Morley papers Ms Eng. d. 3450, notebook diary, ff. 65–67, 12 July 1892. 
44Matthew (ed.), Gladstone Diaries, XII, pp. 40–41, Gladstone to Lord Spencer 13 
July 1892; Gordon (ed.), The Red Earl, ii, pp. 209–10. 
45Matthew (ed.), Gladstone Diaries, XIII, p. 184, Cabinet meeting, 20 Jan. 1893. 
46PD, X, cc. 1604–6, 6 Apr. 1893.  
 
 
  
civil servant of the 1850s, Sir Charles Trevelyan, further developed this theme. In 
answer to the opposition taunt that in creating a new Parliament and a new executive 
the home rule bill rather than make any savings would double expenditure, Trevelyan 
minimised the probable cost of the new Parliament. Pointing out that Ireland already 
had an executive he then detailed the scope for savings in the administration, where 
‘very large economies’ could be made even taking account of the cost of pensions for 
retired civil servants. Trevelyan insisted that ‘there is everywhere a field for economy, 
which will endure long after these temporary pensions have passed away’.47 Thus it 
was absolutely clear that home rule would and must mean a steep reduction in the size 
of the Irish civil service and therefore dismissals on a large scale. This insistence that 
the Irish civil service was over-manned and due a severe reduction raised in the mind 
of every individual civil servant the question as to whether he would himself be 
retained. It was the seemingly virtual certainty of dismissals that was foremost in the 
minds of the Irish civil service as they began to organise a response to the second 
home rule bill. 
   
The 1893 bill as first introduced to the House of Commons in February, provided that 
the permanent civil servants of the crown would continue to receive the same salaries, 
gratuities, and pensions and be required to perform the same duties or analogous 
duties as before for a transitional period of three years. After the three years the 
officers might retire, or might be required to retire by the Irish government, on terms 
which would be in accordance with the fifth schedule of the bill, which remained 
blank.48 Though the language of the bill might imply that those civil servants who 
                                                
47Ibid., cc. 1913–16, 10 Apr. 1893. 
48A Bill To Amend The provision For The Future Government Of Ireland [56 Vict.] 
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were retained would retain their status and conditions, Morley made it absolutely 
clear that there could be no guarantee of continuance of current conditions or status 
beyond the transitional period.49 After the transition period the Castle apparatus was 
on its own and many could anticipate a ‘clean sweep’ when full authority was passed 
to an Irish executive. For the civil servants who were retained after the transition 
period their situation would be that they would cease to be servants of Her Majesty 
and would be starting afresh with a new government with whom they would have to 
bargain anew.50 The second division clerks of the Irish civil service, though almost 
certain to face a dramatic reduction in numbers, had the security that they were, since 
the Lyon Playfair reforms, the servants of the civil service commissioners of the 
United Kingdom and would be therefore entitled to re-deployment within Great 
Britain, should they not be required by the Irish government.51 
   
The agitation amongst, and on behalf of, the Irish civil service arose mainly from the 
relatively small number of higher civil servants, the heads of departments and senior 
officials, and included the professional grades, about five hundred in all.52 This 
represents a highly conscious organisation at the top levels of the Irish administrative 
apparatus. As a result of their campaign the impact of the home rule bill on the Irish 
civil service received a much wider debate, and greater sympathy, than had been the 
case in the 1886 bill. With the first reading of the bill a delegate Committee of 
Permanent Civil Servants in Ireland was formed, numbering eighty in all, elected by 
and representing virtually every profession, department and office of the Irish 
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administration.53 The delegate conference then elected an executive committee.  
Though the Treasury continued to refuse to countenance any trade union organisation 
within the civil service as a whole, the question of what protection and pensions 
would be offered to Irish civil servants in the proposed home rule legislation was 
allowed to become the key issue organising and mobilising those civil servants in a 
quasi-trade union. 
   
At the request of the civil service committee Morley delayed the publication of the 
schedule setting out the compensation terms for the Irish civil servants.54 On the 1 
April the civil service delegation, led by George Morris, President of the LGB, 
composed of some of the highest-ranking civil servants in Dublin Castle, met with 
Morley.55 They carried a list of suggested amendments to the bill, designed to protect 
the interests of the Irish civil service. It was generally supposed that an Irish 
government would purge the civil service, with every encouragement from the British 
government, and that the role of the legislation was to guarantee pension entitlements. 
The legislation was framed as if home rule was a standard abolition of a government 
department. Such abolitions had become more usual within British administration. 
Abolition terms offered security for pensions already earned and usually also offered 
additional years as compensation for loss of office. As well as fighting for better 
terms for abolished offices the committee wanted to include an option for civil 
servants themselves to retire voluntarily with compensation. Additionally they wanted 
additional compensation for professionally qualified civil servants who had 
abandoned private practice to enter government service. The committee was also 
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unhappy that the Treasury retained ultimate discretion over the decisions on all 
pensions awarded. Thus the strategy adopted by the civil service committee was to 
accept the government view that home rule was, administratively speaking, a process 
of departmental abolition and to fight for the best terms possible. With the publication 
of the fifth schedule, it became clear that though the terms on offer to the civil service 
were an improvement on those of 1886 the improvements were minimal.56 The civil 
service committee had requested that officers forced to retire should get a pension 
equivalent to three-fourths of his salary if he had less than 25 tears service, along with 
a gratuity of one year’s salary. If the length of service was over 25 years then a 
pension should be equal to his salary at the date of retirement. Where an officer was 
not forced but still opted for retirement then a pension should be granted, depending 
on length of service, of one-half to three-fourths of salary. What the government 
offered was a pension varying from one-seventh to two-thirds of salary, with no 
gratuities, and an absolute limit of two-thirds of pay on any pension awarded. 
   
For the professional civil servants the committee also wanted a facility for calculating 
added years for professionally qualified persons who had left practices in order to take 
up government employment, but this was not granted. Nor were they offered, as they 
asked, that those civil servants kept on by the Irish government would retain the 
option to retire at any point in the future. The committee also wanted some guarantee 
from the United Kingdom government, with whom after all they had some sort of 
contract of employment, for the salaries and pensions of civil servants retained under 
any home rule administration. But at the same time the committee retained a deep 
distrust of the Treasury and its discretionary powers in regard to pensions, which were 
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all retained in the legislation. What the civil servants wanted in summary, were 
guarantees as to status, salary and pensions, and security for any future salaries and 
pensions which would be dependent on the votes of an Irish legislature, which meant 
therefore some sort of continuing imperial guarantee. What the civil servants did get 
was an increase in the transition period from three to five years. They also got a useful 
innovation in the shape of a joint committee of the Treasury and the Irish government 
with the power to determine claims of wrongful dismissal brought by civil servants 
against the Irish executive during the five years. Though the civil servants of 1893 did 
not yet see the potential of it, the monopoly on civil service matters enjoyed by the 
Treasury had been broken.57 
 
The Committee of Permanent Civil Servants in Ireland then prepared a very detailed 
and substantial ‘response to the government proposals on home rule as regards the 
effect on civil servant’', and despatched the Chairman, T.W. Grimshaw of the RGO, 
and the Secretary Arnold Graves, of the Charitable Donations and Bequests Office, to 
London to begin a political lobby at Westminster.58 In comparing the points in the 
civil servants’ own response and the points made by the Conservatives in debate, and 
in the Conservative newspapers, it is apparent that these Irish civil servants were very 
effective lobbyists. 
   
As well as relentlessly pushing the demand for enhanced security, even to the extent 
of pensions at full pay for those compelled to retire, and arguing against the 
government proposals line by line, the civil service response also made a general 
statement of the sense of grievance felt by the Irish civil service. The theme running 
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through their statement is that it was the permanent status of the employment that 
induced most, if not all, civil servants into service. This was especially true of 
professionally qualified men who had exchanged the possibilities of advancement in a 
private career for the securities of a civil service position. With the government 
suggesting that large reductions would have to be made in the Irish establishment and 
that a large number of civil servants would be retired at the same time, most of them 
could not hope to gain employment in a poor country like Ireland. Many, confident of 
secure lifetime employment, had taken out leases on property and insured their lives 
and undertaken other responsibilities which, on the terms offered, they could not 
afford to sustain. 
 
The civil service statement wanted better compensation for the ordinary civil servants, 
more generous terms for the many professionals who had been recently recruited in 
the many new posts created under the recent policy of constructive Unionism, and 
better commutation terms for those who opted to capitalise their pensions and thus 
begin a new career. They wanted also the option for civil servants to transfer to 
England to analogous posts. The threat was also implied that the entire body of civil 
servants, faced with the choice of an inadequate but secure imperial pension if they 
choose to retire immediately, or an unsecured future salary from an Irish government, 
would choose retirement now, thus denuding the administration of all its experienced 
officers.59 
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The second stage debate opened with the fifth schedule, which detailed the terms on 
which civil servants would be compensated on retirement, still blank.60 Much the 
most effective and cynical use of the question of the Irish civil servants was made by 
A.J. Balfour who, when he was formerly Conservative Chief Secretary for Ireland, 
had been contemptuous of their abilities. During the second reading he travelled to 
Dublin to speak at a meeting of the Irish Unionist Alliance at the Leinster Hall. The 
main and best point he made was that strictly speaking there was no such thing as an 
‘Irish’ or ‘English’ or ‘Scottish’ civil servants, all were imperial civil servants in a 
single civil service not divided by nationalities. This was true for the mass of the 
second division clerks, but for the rest of the Irish civil service it was not true. The 
Irish civil service, it had been long maintained by both Liberal and Conservative 
commentators, was anomalous and the autonomous boards, which were the mainstay 
of the Irish administration, were largely an Irish device. Nonetheless the point was 
well made and received with cheers. In condemning the plan to hand the Irish civil 
service over to ‘their deadliest and most determined enemies’, many of the points he 
made were taken from the Irish civil servants statement; emphasising the betrayal of 
the implied exchange of low pay for security and a pension, the destruction of chances 
of promotion, the burden of commitments entered into in the expectation of a life-long 
career, commitments which would be unsustainable on the terms of compensation 
offered.61 The Times took up these points and, repeating the theme that the civil 
servants were officials of the imperial service, linked the ‘shameful betrayal of the 
landlords’ (a reference to the land purchase acts) with the ‘abandonment of the civil 
servants of the Crown’.62 The presence of at least one senior civil servant at the 
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Leinster Hall meeting was raised in the House of Commons, but the cheers that 
Balfour’s eulogy of the Irish civil service raised indicates that there were a great many 
more of them present.63 
  
The committee stage on the civil service clause 28 and the related schedule, which the 
government might have hoped would be relatively non-controversial and therefore 
brief, took a full three days of debate from the 17 to 19 July. As the debate progressed 
it grew more and more fractious. Morley, in introducing the clause admitted that the 
terms were not acceptable to the civil servants affected but that, whilst he felt a 
responsibility to be fair, equitable and generous to the civil service, he was bound not 
to impose an unreasonable or excessive load of financial responsibility on the Irish 
government. Morley offered as guiding principles for the clause that the civil servants 
were to be protected from capricious dismissal or reductions in salary whilst the Irish 
government had to be protected from sudden en masse retirement and from a sullen 
and inefficient service. To meet this principle the bill gave de facto control to the 
Treasury of the number of civil servants that might resign or be required to resign, for 
five years. The scales for calculating compensation payment for those civil servants 
either dismissed or who choose to resign within the five-year period, though based on 
the standard abolition terms, were generous in the extent to which they exceeded 
those terms. A civil servant with 25 years service could opt to retire on a pension of 
two-thirds of the salary he would have reached at the end of the five year transition 
period, even if he choose to retire immediately.64 
       
                                                
63PD, X, cc. 448–49, 17 Apr. 1893. 
64Ibid., XI, cc. 1779–89, 17 July 1893. 
 
 
  
The Unionist opposition attacked the clause from two directions. First, the Irish 
Unionists put the case for expanding the class of civil servant included in the clause. 
A strong case was put for the 12,000 national school teachers, or at least the 
Protestant teachers. Second, the Conservatives, taking up a theme of the Irish Civil 
Service Committee, returned again and again to the implicit contract between 
government and civil service and the breach of faith that home rule entailed. Balfour 
began by refusing to accept that home rule was simply a departmental reconstruction. 
It was, he insisted, a great official revolution in which there would be a vengeful 
clearing out of the Castle under the guise of economy and that therefore the terms on 
offer were wholly inadequate as compensation. His amendment proposed that all 
dismissed or resigned civil servants would have a right of relocating to a 
corresponding post in England or Scotland. Lord Randolph Churchill and T.W 
Russell supported the theme of a breach of the rights of civil servants, their ‘freehold’ 
in office. Gladstone, Morley and Fowler of course vehemently denied the very 
concept of civil servants having any ‘rights’, nonetheless government amendments 
tended to extend the security offered to the Irish civil servants, thus granting the effect 
whilst denying the fact of ‘rights’. This in turn infuriated both Liberals and Irish 
Nationalists. Henry Labouchere worked himself into a fury at the thought of a legion 
of Irish ex-civil servants living lives of pensioned idleness because they happened to 
dislike government policy. The Nationalist M.P.s Luke Hayden and John Clancy 
exposed the contradictions in the compensatory clause. The very foundation of the 
home rule case was that Ireland was inefficiently administered under the British 
regime. Since Gladstone’s 1886 bill it had been asserted without contradiction that 
Ireland was burdened by an expensive and bloated apparatus and that home rule 
addressed that problem by substituting native rule for Castle misgovernment. 
 
 
  
Logically therefore it was Britain ought to pay any compensation offered to their 
imposed, inefficient and superfluous civil servants. The whole tendency of the 
government was to erode the already small Irish budgetary surplus by saddling the 
Irish executive with a burden of compensation created by British misgovernment. The 
anxiety of the government to assuage the fears of the Irish civil service did lead to one 
extraordinary innovation. Morley, to meet the anomalous case of model 
schoolteachers and petty session clerks, introduced an amendment to include any 
officer who ‘though not in the permanent Civil Service, is in the public service of the 
Crown’ within the terms of compensation.65 This new category ‘the public service of 
the Crown’ was extremely vague and once introduced had the potential to expand 
endlessly. For instance, it was a category that could and would be successfully applied 
to the servants of the Congested Districts Board and the education boards.66 It was 
apparent that the tendency of the debate was for the opposition to agree with the 
government in any amendment that enhanced civil service security or enlarged the 
categories entitled to compensation, much to the fury of the Irish nationalists who 
could see the meagre Irish surplus disappearing in pensions. 
 
By any measure the Irish civil service could be pleased with its progress during the 
home rule debate of 1893. An organisation was formed which had lobbied a reluctant 
Chief Secretary and had succeeded in making the status and security of the Irish civil 
service an issue of debate. Intense political lobbying by civil servants, which formerly 
had been considered gross insubordination at best and subversion at worst, had been 
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recognised and accepted in the Irish case.67 The separate interests of the Irish civil 
servants, it had been indirectly admitted, were not guarded adequately either by the 
Treasury or by the government. The government had been made to offer some 
significant improvements in the terms of the bill, but this had been mainly in 
extending those civil service grades covered by the terms. Civil servants might not, in 
strict terms, have ‘rights’ but Irish civil servants had secured protection for something 
that looked sufficiently like rights as to make the term not worth quarrelling over. 
However a significant setback had to be recorded in their failure to make the 
government offer any concession on the transition period of five years. Had the 1893 
home rule bill succeeded the Irish civil service would have been faced with the choice 
of either opting for such terms of retirement as were offered within five years or 
forgoing them altogether. A more permanent guarantee remained an unrealised 
objective. There is no doubt that home rule weakened civil service loyalty to the state 
by introducing an element of conditionality to a relationship that had hitherto seemed 
as permanent as the state itself. 
 
However with the defeat of the 1893 bill, home rule seemed to have passed into 
history. Parnell was already dead and his political party was tearing itself apart in the 
bitter divisions brought on by Parnell's tragic final struggle. Gladstone, the sponsor of 
two attempts to pass a home rule measure for Ireland, retired in early 1894 and his 
Liberal Party moderated its commitment to Irish home rule. After the failure of the 
second home rule bill Morley was still convinced that the only effective reform of 
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Irish government would be home rule and did not attempt any significant changes in 
the way the Irish administration functioned. He reverted to the strategy of O’Brien 
and Healy and concentrated on the ‘reduction of the old Protestant Ascendancy’ 
through the recruitment and advancement of Catholics.68 Despite the supposed 
operation of controlled entry to the civil service by the civil service commissioners 
Morley still retained the control of patronage over a great number of Irish posts.69 The 
1895 general election returned the Conservatives to power. 
 
Under the Conservative policy of ‘Killing Home Rule By Kindness’ the British state 
in Ireland took on the task of becoming a development agency. New departments 
were created, such as the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction 
(DATI), the Congested Districts Board, (CDB) the Irish Land Commission (ILC) and 
the Local Government Board (LGB).  Apart from an increase in the number of 
bureaucratic functionaries these new departments also required a growing number of 
professional staff such as lawyers, engineers, architects, valuers, agricultural scientists 
and instructional experts to oversee land reform, or social and agricultural 
development. New duties were added to an existing post where possible otherwise a 
new position was created.  By 1912 there were over 40 departments in an Irish 
administration that was run in parallel by Whitehall and by Dublin. The eleven United 
Kingdom departments run by Whitehall co-existed with the 29 wholly Irish 
departments. The great development departments, National Education Board (NEB), 
Intermediate Education Board (IEB) LGB, CDB and the DATI, were run by civil 
servants but managed by unpaid boards and were therefore independent of the 
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political head of the Irish administration, the chief secretary Ireland. In the 50 years 
between 1861 and 1911, when the Irish population declined by 32 per cent, the 
number of Irish civil servants grew by at least 350 per cent.70 
 
The Treasury found the task of curbing the expansion of administration and 
expenditure, its primary task in Britain, impossible in Ireland where the function of 
the state seemed to be to spend on a vast scale. The Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) of the Commons was just as unsuccessful in curbing Irish expenditure. In 1902 
the PAC was clearly infuriated by unauthorised and excessive expenditure in the Irish 
departments. When it was pointed out that these departments were all autonomous 
and there was no single official who could answer for them, and that the PAC would 
have to have all the separate accounting officers to London if it wished to pursue the 
question, it decided to retreat. The Irish accounts became a torture that the PAC had to 
undergo each year and from which it seemed there was no relief.71 As the permanent 
head of the LGB, Henry Robinson, noted (with some hint of satisfaction) the Treasury 
mandarins ‘grew to hate the name of Ireland’. 
  
In the aftermath of Gladstonian home rule the character of the Irish civil service 
changed with a much more professional and interventionist ethos becoming apparent. 
The dominance of the legal offices was weakened. The state began to seem less an 
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apparatus of domination over Irish society and more one of service. However the 
home rule debate had irrevocably broken the close identity between the Irish civil 
service and the state. Despite the insistence that there was a single United Kingdom 
civil service no civil servant could be in doubt that Ireland was different and that the 
apparatus in Ireland was considered not only separate but also dispensable. Unionists 
such as Lord Dunraven and Nationalists such as Redmond all agreed that the Irish 
civil service was bloated, inefficient and a barrier to the better government of Ireland, 
whatever form that might take. Irish civil servants had nonetheless developed 
considerable organisational ability. The Irish civil service had very quickly learned to 
think of itself as a corporate body united across all ranks by the threat of dismissal 
implied in the rhetoric of the home rule. On the eve of the third home rule crisis the 
civil service though assailed on all sides had the organisational foundations to 
withstand the assault. 
 
Gladstone’s influence reached beyond the grave to shape the 1912 home rule bill.72 
The crisis of the British state in Ireland that unfolded between 1912 and 1922 is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However it might be noted in conclusion that the Irish 
civil servants used the crisis and the several variations on home rule that it threw up to 
extend their organisational and political demand for security for their status. They 
succeeded in having written into the constitution of the Irish Free State clauses which 
converted their previous status as serving at the ‘pleasure of the crown’ into a 
contractual relationship with legal and therefore defensible status. This was a result 
which no doubt would have appalled Gladstone but it was one which reflected the 
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ability of the Irish civil service to use political influence to thwart any measure that 
proposed to make them pay the price for Gladstonian tight-fistedness.73  
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